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WHEN THE POSTMAN BEEPS TWICE:
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC MAIL
UNDER THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION OF
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Anthony J. Dreyer*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are the plaintiff's attorney in a copyright infringement
suit. You allege that the defendant copied certain printing fonts
owned by your client, and then sold them to a software manufacturer
for use in their latest software package. During the discovery process,
you learn that the software manufacturer routinely evaluates all the
fonts it plans to use for potential copyright infringements. You also
learn that most of the software manufacturer's business records are
computerized.
Accordingly, you subpoena the software manufacturer's computer
files in the hopes of finding support for your claim. In reviewing the
files, you find the "smoking gun"-an internal electronic mail
("e-mail") 1 message from a manager whose job it was to review the
defendant's product and report her findings to her superior. In the
message, the manager asserts that the fonts produced by the defend-
ant are "strikingly similar" to your client's. The e-mail, dated only
two days before the software went into production, also lists a signifi-
cant number of similarities between the two products.
You consider the impact of the e-mail on your case, and wonder
how you may use this evidence in court. Because you wish to admit
the e-mail for the truth of what it asserts-that the fonts share a
number of striking similarities-you recognize that the e-mail's admis-
sibility will probably be challenged on the grounds that it is hearsay.
Because the software manufacturer is not party to the suit, the e-mail
is not admissible as an admission by a party opponent.2 You are confi-
dent, however, that you will be able to admit the e-mail under the
business records exception to the hearsay bar.3 After all, the man-
* I am grateful to Daniel C. Richman, Associate Professor, Fordham University
School of Law, for his comments on prior drafts of this Note. I would also like to
thank my fiancde and my family for their encouragement and support while writing
this Note.
1. As used in this Note, the term "e-mail" is broadly meant to encompass many
different forms of electronically transmitted text. See infra notes 15-16 and accompa-
nying text.
2. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
3. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Rule 803(6) excludes from the hearsay bar.
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record,
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ager's regular business duty was to review such products and report
her findings to her superiors. Surprisingly, however, the judge may
disagree and decline to admit the e-mail as a business record.4
E-mail use by individuals and businesses has transcended mere fad,
and has become an inescapable element of modern communications.
While the volume of mail delivered by the United States Post Office
has risen five percent in the past seven years, business-to-business
mail has dropped thirty-three percent over the same period.5 The
Post Office acknowledges that much of that loss is due to e-mail and
other forms of electronic communication.6 As corporate e-mail use
increases, so too does the risk of liability from e-mail statements.7
The hypothetical above provides an example of the growing impor-
tance of e-mail evidence in litigation. As the illustration suggests,
however, because e-mail messages are out-of-court statements, parties
introducing them in court will often have to overcome the hearsay
bar.8
Presently, no legislation specifically governs the admissibility of
computer documents, let alone e-mail, in the United States Federal
Courts.9 The Federal Rules of Evidence ("FREs") provide a general
hearsay exception, however, allowing for the admission of business
records. 10 This exception extends to memoranda and correspon-
dence," as well as to computerized records and data.' 2 The exception
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (emphasis added).
4. See Monotype Corp. v. International Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443 (9th Cir.
1994) (declining to admit e-mail messages under the business records exception to the
hearsay bar). The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on the Monotype case,
which is discussed more fully in part II.A.2 below.
5. Suniel Ratan, Snail Mail Struggles to Survive, Tme, Special Issue: Welcome to
Cyberspace, Spring 1995, at 40.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
8. See infra part I.D.
9. Kevin J. Kotch, Addressing the Legal Problems of International Electronic
Data Interchange: The Use of Computer Records as Evidence in Different Legal Sys-
tems, 6 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 451, 459 (1993). As Kotch points out however,
Congress has passed legislation making computer-based records admissible to prove
electronic funds transfer transactions. ld. at 459 n.71. Under the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act, "For each electronic fund transfer initiated by a consumer from an elec-
tronic terminal, the financial institution holding such consumer's account shall .... at
the time the transfer is initiated, make available to the consumer written documenta-
tion of such transfer." 15 U.S.C. § 1693d(a) (1994). Section 1693d further provides
that "In any action involving a consumer, any documentation required by this section
to be given to the consumer which indicates that an electronic fund transfer was made
to another person shall be admissible as evidence of such transfer and shall constitute
prima facie proof that such transfer was made." Id., § 1693d(f) (emphasis added).
10. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
11. See infra part II.D.
12. See infra part II.C.
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also has been applied to other forms of electronic communications,
such as telex messages. 3 Uncertainty exists, however, as to whether
e-mail constitutes a business record under FRE 803(6). While some
courts recognize the admissibility of e-mail under the business records
exception, others have held that e-mail does not meet the require-
ments of FRE 803(6).' 4
This Note examines the admissibility of e-mail under the business
records exception to the hearsay bar, FRE 803(6). More specifically,
this Note argues that e-mail is a hybrid of computer-based records and
correspondence, both of which may be admitted under FRE 803(6).
Accordingly, e-mail should be admissible under FRE 803(6) as long as
the particular message satisfies the requirements of the Rule.
Part I of this Note discusses the use and characteristics of e-mail
and then explores changes in the legal landscape brought on by the
e-mail revolution. Part II describes the hearsay bar under FRE 802,
as well as the business records exception under FRE 803(6). Part II
also examines the application of FRE 803(6) to computer-based
records and traditional paper memoranda, two analogues of e-mail.
Part HI analyzes the application of FRE 803(6) to e-mail evidence.
While acknowledging that not all e-mail messages would necessarily
qualify as business records under FRE 803(6), part I argues that
e-mail, as it is used by many organizations, meets the explicit require-
ments of FRE 803(6) and satisfies the policies behind the Rule. This
part urges courts analyzing e-mail under FRE 803(6) to focus on the
content of the document and on the context of its preparation, and not
merely on the medium used to transmit document. This Note con-
cludes that the business records exception is broad enough to encom-
pass e-mail communications. Because of courts' confusion about
e-mail systems, however, a change in the FREs is necessary to provide
a clear mandate as to the appropriate treatment of e-mail evidence,
and to emphasize that the medium itself is capable of supporting sys-
tematic recordkeeping activities. Until this happens, courts will likely
continue to struggle in their interpretation and application of FRE
803(6), resulting in inconsistent treatment of the admissibility of elec-
tronic communications.
I. THE E-MAIL REVOLUTION
While some may think of e-mail merely as a message system, e-mail
has a wide range of applications in modem business practice. As busi-
nesses' use of e-mail has expanded, interesting new issues have arisen
concerning e-mail and its use in the legal arena.
13. See infra part mI.A.1.
14. See infra part mI.A.2.
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A. Widespread Use of E-mail
E-mail has been defined as "[a] document created or received on an
electronic mail system including brief notes, more formal or substan-
tive narrative documents, and any attachments, such as word process-
ing and other electronic documents, which may be transmitted with
the messages."' 5 An electronic-mail system is "[a] computer applica-
tion used to create, receive, and transmit messages and other
documents."' 6
Some observers consider e-mail to be the fastest growing method of
electronic communication in business today. 7 Employees of most
large companies and law firms currently use e-mail as part of their
daily communications routine. 8 The following statistics illustrate the
magnitude of e-mail use:
In the United States today, there are close to 20 million electronic
mail ("[e]-mail") users, more than half of whom went on line since
1990. It is projected that there will be more than 40 million [e]-mail
users nationwide by the year 2000. These [projected] 40 million [e]-
mail users will be sending an estimated 60 billion messages annually.
The [e]-mail explosion has had a huge impact on business as well.
Today, 90 percent of all companies with more than 1,000 employees
use [e]-mail.19
Exactly what percentage of e-mail use is "business-related," is unclear;
estimates suggest, however, that the computerized workforce totals
nearly forty million.2 °
With the expansion of the Internet2' and other commercial on-line
providers such as Prodigy and America Online,' e-mail use is sure to
15. National Archives and Records Administration, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,634, 44,641
(1995) (to be published at 36 C.F.R. § 1234.2).
16. Id.
17. Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-mail! Employee E-mail Monitoring and
Privacy Law in the Age of the "Electronic Sweatshop," 28 J. Marshall L. Rev. 139, 139
(1994).
18. See Matthew Goldstein, Electronic Mail, Computer Messages Present Knotty
Issues of Discovery, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1994, at 1, 5.
19. Frank C. Morris, Jr., E-Mail Communications. The Next Employment Law
Nightmare, CA30 ALI-ABA 571, 573 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
20. 139 Cong. Rec. E1077, E1078 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993) (statement of Rep. Pat
Williams).
21. The Internet is a global network connecting vast numbers of computer net-
works together. G. Burgess Allison, At the Edge of the E-Frontier-An Introduction
to the Internet, Pa. Law., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 12, 13. "It links together the massive
online service bureaus, such as CompuServe, Prodigy and America On-line. It links
together hundreds of thousands of universities, government agencies and corpora-
tions located in almost 100 countries around the world." Id. The number of Internet
users has nearly doubled each year since the mid-1980's; as of 1995, between 30 and
40 million people had access to the Internet. Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, Welcome to
Cyberspace, Time, Special Issue: Welcome to Cyberspace, Spring 1995, at 9.
22. America Online provides private e-mail accounts, as well as Internet access,
for more than 4.5 million subscribers. Kelly Heyboer, Clue to Bizarre Murder May Lie
Within E-mail, The Star Ledger, Jan. 31, 1996, at 1, 9.
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grow exponentially. These "computer networks operate as electronic
post offices... allow[ing] users to communicate with one another via
electronic mail."23 The growth of these networks has also created a
new working environment. An estimated three million employees of
United States companies "telecommute," working from home or
other remote locations via computer and modem.21 Such devices al-
low outside users to connect directly to a company's e-mail network.
These technological advances have created a new type of "virtual of-
fice," where paper records have disappeared, and documents once
stored in filing cabinets are now stored electronically.'
As this information suggests, e-mail, unlike its electronic predeces-
sor-the telex26-encompasses more than simple messages between
two parties.27 In today's modem business setting, e-mail messages
may include status reports, inventory lists, minutes of meetings, drafts
of documents, business strategies, or records of important business de-
cisions.28 This growth, however, is not without its disadvantages.
Analysts agree that e-mail may potentially expose a party to a legal
liability.29 Because of e-mail's informal nature and perceived imper-
manence, people often use it to send messages that may be inappro-
priate or too candid to "put in writing."30 Ideas are recorded, business
23. Nofe, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1062, 1067 (1994).
24. Leon Jaroff, Age of the Road Warrior, Time, Special Issue: Welcome to Cyber-
space, Spring 1995, at 38. Jaroff notes that the number of telecommuters increases
roughly 20% each year, and that the rate will likely accelerate with technological ad-
vances. Id.
25. 1&
26. A telex is "a communication service involving teletypewriters connected by
wire through automatic exchanges." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1212
(10th ed. 1995). Telex messages are transmitted in a fashion similar to e-mail
messages. A sender uses a teletypewriter to enter the message, which is then trans-
mitted electronically to its recipient. See Richard A. Kuehn, Cost-Effective Telecom-
munications 50-51 (1975).
27. Telex messages differ from e-mail messages in three significant ways: they nor-
mally require a telex operator to type and send the message; they are transferred
messages at a slower rate because of technological limitations; and they generally
must be printed out and hand delivered to their ultimate recipient. See iL at 51-52.
28. See Rick v. Toyota Indus. Equip. Co., No. 93 C 1331, 1994 WL 484633, at *7
n.4 (N.D. Ill Sept. 2, 1994) (involving e-mail record of inventory list); Aviles v. Mc-
Kenzie, No. C-91-2013-DIU, 1992 WL 715248, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1992) (involv-
ing e-mail used as a status report); National Archives and Records Administration, 60
Fed. Reg. 44,634, 44,635 (1995) (discussing the circulation of business drafts on e-
mail).
29. See Morris, supra note 19, at 574; Jaroff, supra note 24, at 38.
30. Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-mail and Other Computer-
ized Information, Ariz. Att'y, Apr. 1995, at 16, 16; see also Joey Frazier, Electronic
Sleuthing: John Jessen's Evidence Discovery Enterprise, Law. PC, Aug. 15, 1993, at 1
("In some cases, documents or memos may be stored only electronically, never
printed, because of their sensitive nature."); Goldstein, supra note 18, at 5 ("Employ-
ees and employers say things in an e-mail message that they would never dare to put
in a written memorandum."). In what may be considered an extreme example of the
sensitivity of e-mail postings, members of the National Security Council were found to
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decisions are made, and plans are implemented, all within the envi-
ronment of electronic mail.3' As a result, e-mail often provides insight
into "corporate knowledge and behavior."32 Because courts have up-
held e-mail discovery requests, 33 e-mail messages can, and have, be-
come fodder for legal action. 4
Because of e-mail's unique qualities, courts and scholars alike have
debated the manner in which courts should treat e-mail evidence.
Some commentators liken it to a telephone conversation,35 while
others argue that it should be treated like written correspondence. 36
Some fear that many judges are ill-equipped to decide e-mail issues
because they lack the technical understanding of how e-mail systems
work.
37
B. E-mail's Unique Characteristics
E-mail does indeed differ from more traditional forms of communi-
cation. Most e-mail systems can create a complete record of the com-
munication, capturing the exact text that users send and receive.3 8
This eliminates the possibility of misperception and faded memory-
problems which often plague traditional conversations-when the
e-mail is recalled at a later date. Additionally, e-mail records usually
store information regarding their transmission and receipt.39 This may
include the names of the sender and recipient(s), the date and time
that the messages were sent and received, and an acknowledgment
that the e-mail was retrieved. 0 This information "may be 'of tremen-
dous ... value in demonstrating what.., personnel were involved in
have used e-mail to "relay lengthy substantive-even classified-'notes.' "Armstrong
v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
31. Kenneth Shear, Don't Risk the Case By Disregarding Electronic Evidence,
Mich. Law. Wkly., Aug. 29, 1994, at 27.
32. Martha Middleton, A Discovery: There May Be Gold in E-Mail, Nat'l L.J.,
Sept. 20, 1993, at 1, 40.
33. See infra part I.C.4.
34. See infra part I.D.
35. See, e.g., Leslie Helm, The Digital Smoking Gun: Mismanaged E-Mail Poses
Serious Risks, Experts Warn, L.A. Tunes, June 16, 1994, at D1 (" 'It's a substitute for a
phone call ... ' ").
36. Miranda Ewell, E-mail: Is the Boss Peeking?, San Jose Mercury News, Apr.
18, 1994, at 12A.
37. See id; see also Middleton, supra note 32, at 40 (noting that "judges need to
become more sophisticated about electronic media").
38. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1279 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
39. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, New Federal E-mail Guidelines, N.Y.
Li., May 10, 1994, at 3.
40. Id In the context of federal e-mail, this information would greatly aid "re-
searchers and investigators studying the formulation and dissemination of significant
policy initiatives at the highest reaches of our government." Armstrong, 1 F.3d at
1285.
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making a particular policy decision and what officials knew, and when
they knew it.' "41
Compared to paper communications, e-mail is a more permanent
medium. Paper documents can be shredded or discarded, but destroy-
ing e-mail is more difficult. People mistakenly assume that e-mail can
be removed from computer storage by simply pressing the "DEL~rE"
key or some similar device. Even if a user deletes a message from her
machine, however, most e-mail systems store messages on a central-
ized backup file for an indefinite period of time.42 As one commenta-
tor noted, "[I]t is relatively easy to retrieve an erased or deleted
e-mail message from most computer data bases.14 3 These mainframe
backups also make archiving and retrieving e-mail records much eas-
ier than their paper counterparts. E-mail also differs from traditional
paper correspondence in that it can be sent instantly via electronic
networks" without need for manual delivery or third-party interven-
tion. In short, e-mail provides a more detailed, more permanent, and
more complete record than traditional correspondence.
C. The Effect of E-mail on the Legal Landscape
As e-mail use has become more prevalent in business and personal
use, law enforcement officials, legislators, and attorneys alike have be-
gun to recognize its value. Consequently, new legal issues with re-
spect to e-mail are cropping up every day.
1. Law Enforcement Use
E-mail has helped law enforcement officials collect evidence for
subsequent arrests. In September of 1995, for example, FBI Agents
used e-mail to aid in a nationwide child pornography sting. 45 Agents
used e-mail wiretaps and posed as prospective buyers of pornographic
material, soliciting information via e-mail.4 The Secret Service em-
ployed similar tactics to arrest six members of an illegal cellular phone
ring.47 In Germany, officials are closely monitoring the e-mail of Neo-
Nazi groups in the hopes of uncovering illegal activity.48 New Jersey
Police recently seized records of private e-mail from America Online
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. See McNeil & Kort, supra note 30, at 18. While the average time that e-mail
systems store data varies, these systems are capable of storing thousands, even mil-
lions of e-mail messages. See infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
43. Goldstein, supra note 18, at 1, 5.
44. McNeil & Kort, supra note 30, at 16.
45. Stephen Labaton, Computer Stings Gain Favor as Arrests for Smut Increase,
N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 16, 1995, at Al.
46. Id. at Al, A8.
47. Robert Rudolph, Sting in Cyberspace Snares Cell Phone, Credit Card Bandits,
The Star-Ledger, Sept. 12, 1995, at 15.
48. Alan Cowell, Neo-Nazis Now Network on Line and Underground, N.Y. Tunes,
Oct. 22, 1995, at 3.
1996] 2291
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to be used as potential evidence in a murder case.4 9 Police say the
suspect and his victim met in a public "chat room" on America Online
and continued to communicate through private e-mail on the sys-
tem °.5  Officials hope to use the e-mail to establish a link between the
two men.51 These examples underscore the potential for criminal lia-
bility that may arise directly or indirectly from e-mail postings.52
2. Changes (and Near Changes) in Federal Legislation
The growth of e-mail use by businesses and individuals has led to
new legislation by Congress. These changes include a ban on certain
e-mail messages, as well as prohibitions on e-mail interception. While
the ramifications of these changes have yet to be realized fully, e-mail
and e-mail evidence will apparently play an increasing role in federal
litigation.
On February 8, 1996, Congress approved the Telecommunicatons
Act of 1996.53 Title V of the Act contains the Communications De-
cency Act, which prohibits the transmission of certain offensive com-
munications.54 The Act bans users of any interactive computer service
from displaying "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal .... or
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive... sexual or excretory activities. ' 55 The Act simi-
larly prohibits the transmission of comments or other communications
which are obscene or indecent, if the recipient is known to be a mi-
nor.56 Violation of these provisions constitutes a felony.5 7
Immediately after the Act was passed, the American Civil Liberties
Union challenged the constitutionality of the Act.58 The Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania enjoined the Justice Department from enforcing
the indecency provisions of the Act, but allowed enforcement of the
49. Heyboer, supra note 22, at 1.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Examples of e-mail monitoring and acquisition such as those discussed here
have caused many commentators to reexamine Fourth Amendment and right to pri-
vacy issues in light of e-mail. See Lee, supra note 17; Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise
Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in the Network, 30
Wake Forest L. Rev. 105 (1995). These concerns have prompted legislation designed
to regulate e-mail monitoring by federal and private sources. See infra notes 61-65 and
accompanying text.
53. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110
Stat.) 56.
54. Id. §§ 501-502.
55. Id. § 502.
56. Id.
57. See 142 Cong. Rec. S1180 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1996).
58. See ACLU v. Janet Reno, Civ. No. 96-963 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 15, 1996) (grant-
ing, in part, preliminary injunction) (on file with Fordham Law Review and available
on the World-Wide Web at http:/WWW.aclu.org/court/tro.html). The ACLU sought
a temporary restraining order preventing the Justice Department from enforcing the
Act. Id.
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"patently offensive" provisions, pending further judicial determina-
tion. 9 While the status of the Act remains unclear,'" if it is allowed to
stand, federal courts will undoubtedly face an increase of e-mail evi-
dence in litigation.
E-mail has forced Congress to revisit privacy issues as well. In 1986,
Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA"). I The ECPA protects electronic communications on pub-
lic networks from illegal wiretapping.a While the Act does not ex-
plicitly encompass e-mail, the legislative history clarifies that the term
'electronic communications" as used in the statute also includes
e-mail. 63 While the ECPA protects individuals from e-mail monitor-
ing by federal agents, no analogous protection exists for e-mail moni-
toring in the private sector. In 1993, Senator Paul Simon (D-IU.) and
Representative Pat Williams (D-Mont.) sought to remedy this incon-
gruity by introducing the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act.'
Among the proposed measures of the bill was a provision that would
require employers to notify employees if their e-mail was about to be
monitored.65
3. Mandatory Public Access to Federal E-mail
The e-mail revolution also has forced the federal government to re-
examine its recordkeeping procedures. In Armstrong v. Executive Of-
fice of the President,66 a group of researchers and nonprofit
organizations sought to prevent the deletion of e-mail records created
59. Id
60. Some members of the Congress are already seeking to repeal parts of the
Communications Decency Act. See 142 Cong. Rec. at Sl180.
61. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (1994). For a more detailed discussion of
the ECPA and how it relates to e-mail, see Judith B. Prowda, Privacy and Security of
Data, in A Lawyer's Ramble Down the Information Superhighway, 64 Fordham L
Rev. 697, 738, 758-60 (1995).
63. See S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568. In outlining the types of communications protected by the
ECPA, the Senate noted: "[A] communication is an electronic communication pro-
tected by the federal wiretap law if it is not carried by soundwaves .... Communica-
tions consisting solely of data ... are electronic communications. This term also
includes electronic mail." Id.
64. S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 139 Cong. Rec. S6122 (daily
ed. May 19, 1993); H.R. 1900,103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 139 Cong. Rec.
E1077 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993).
65. See 139 Cong. Rec. at E1077. In stressing the urgent need for the proposed
legislation, Senator Simon cited the case of an Epson Computer administrator who
was fired for refusing to monitor employee e-mail. 139 Cong. Rec. at S6123. The bill
met strong resistance from both business lobbies and the Republican Congress. See
Abdon M. Pallasch, Company Policies to Monitor E-mail Licking Edge of Electronic
Envelope, Chi. Law., Aug. 1995, at 4. Ultimately, Senator Simon "decided to shelve
the bill indefinitely." Id.
66. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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during the Reagan Administration. 67 Plaintiffs argued that e-mail
records should receive the same protection as paper-based records
under the Federal Records Act ("FRA").68 The D.C. Circuit agreed,
holding that "substantive e-mail communications satisfy the FRA def-
inition of 'records.' "69 Accordingly, the court held that e-mail
records, including their transmittal information, should be stored.70
4. Changes in Discovery Practices
As United States government and businesses continue to computer-
ize their operations, electronic media discovery is playing an increas-
ing role in nearly every type of lawsuit, from products liability and
trade secret claims to personal injury cases.7 1 One electronic discov-
ery expert notes: "Twenty to thirty percent of information stored
electronically is never printed, so this information could not be found
in paper discovery.' 72 The Manual for Complex Litigation advises:
"At the outset of the litigation the court should inquire into the exist-
ence of computerized data and processes for its retrieval."73
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCPs") do not ex-
plicitly allow for discovery of e-mail, they do state more generally that
electronically-stored data is discoverable. Rule 34(a) broadly subjects
"data compilations" to discovery.74 Commentators have argued that
the term data compilation applies to documentary information stored
67. Id. at 1277.
68. Id. at 1278. The FRA is codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2188, 2501-2506, 2901-
2909, 3101-3107, 3301-3324 (1988). The goal of the FRA is to ensure the "[a]ccurate
and complete documentation of the policies and transactions of the Federal Govern-
ment." 44 U.S.C. § 2902(1). "If a document qualifies as a record, the FRA prohibits
an agency from discarding it by fiat." Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1278 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 1287.
70. 1& at 1285, 1287 ("In our view... the practice of retaining only the amputated
[absent transmittal information] paper print-outs is flatly inconsistent with Congress'
evident concern with preserving a complete record of government activity for histori-
cal and other uses.").
71. Middleton, supra note 32, at 1, 40 (noting that electronic discovery is "becom-
ing increasingly critical in almost every kind of lawsuit" and that "whether it is e-mail
or another form of electronic information, electronic discovery is likely to become
increasingly commonplace within the next few years").
72. Frazier, supra note 30, at 4.
73. Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.446 (2d ed. 1985). The rise in computer-
ized discovery is underscored by the recently formed Electronic Evidence Discovery,
Inc., a private investigation firm specializing in retrieving electronic data for litigation.
See Frazier, supra note 30, at 1. EED has more than 1600 programs at its disposal for
use in electronic data retrieval. Id at 3.
74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
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on disks, recording tapes, and computer banks,' 5 as well as to e-mail. 6
To date, at least one federal court has agreed. In In re Brand Name
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation,' the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois indicated that "e-mail is
discoverable."' 8 The frequent inclusion of e-mail in discovery re-
quests lends further support to this conclusion.' 9
Under the FRCPs, federal courts have authority to enforce e-mail
discovery requests. 0 The district court in Prescription Drugs upheld
an e-mail discovery request even though it forced the defendant to
turn over some thirty million pages of e-mail.8" At least one state
court also has issued a motion to compel production of e-mail
75. See e.g., Ronald L. Plesser & Emilio W. Cividanes, Discovery and Other
Problems Related to Electronically Stored Data and Privacy, 415 PLI/Pat 277, 277
(1995), available in Westlaw ("FRCP Rule 34(a) broadly subjects words, and docu-
mentary information stored on... disks, recording tapes and computer banks to dis-
covery .... ").
76. See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 5 ("A number of computer savvy attorneys say
e-mail is a particularly good source of discovery .... ."); Michael Traynor, E-mail
Authentication is Key, Nat'l L.., Aug. 1, 1994, at B9 ("E-mail is a potentially attractive
source of discovery .... ").
77. Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526 (N.D. MI1. June 15, 1995) (mem.).
78. Id. at *1.
79. McNeil & Kort, supra note 30, at 16 (stating that "[a] majority of litigants
seeking discovery from a company these days will carefully frame a document request
to include the production of e-mail"); Morris, supra note 19, at 585 ("It is now com-
monplace for a party to demand production of [e]-mail in discovery proceedings.");
Jean Marie R. Pechette, Electronic Records are Discoverable in Litigation, Nat'l L.J.,
June 27, 1994, at C8 (listing e-mail in a checklist of electronic records to include in
discovery requests). For an example of a typical e-mail discovery request, see Baggott
v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-2214V, 1992 WL 79987, at *8
(CL. Ct. Apr. 2, 1992).
80. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party whose discovery requests
are not met may seek a "Motion to Compel" discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). Courts
may impose sanctions on parties who fail to comply with discovery orders. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Permissible sanctions include fines, foreclosure of the use of certain
claims or defenses, or default judgment. Il; see also infra notes 83-84 and accompa-
nying text.
81. Prescription Drugs, 1995 WIL 360526, at *1.
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records.' Failure to comply with such e-mail requests could ulti-
mately lead to sanctions83 or an unfavorable decision in the case. 4
Not only is e-mail discoverable, but parties to pending litigation
may be required to turn over e-mail messages relevant to the case
absent any specific e-mail request. Under FRCP 26(a),8 5 parties must
disclose, before discovery and within a few months of commencement
of the litigation, categories of all documents and data compilations
that are "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings. ' 86
D. General Use of E-Mail in Federal Courts
Although e-mail is obtainable through discovery, there is no guar-
antee that it will be admissible in federal court.' Nonetheless, a sur-
vey of recent civil and criminal cases indicates that e-mail evidence
has indeed found its way into federal courts. While not all of the cases
below involve hearsay e-mail evidence, they underscore the fact that
e-mail is proving as useful in the courtroom as it is in the workplace.
82. IBM v. Comdisco, Inc., C.A. No. 91-C-07-199, 1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 67, at
*9 (Mar. 11, 1992). In Comdisco, the defendant sought to obtain through discovery,
an e-mail message sent from an IBM manager to an IBM account representative. Id.
at *1-2. IBM countered that the e-mail was covered by the attorney/client privilege
since it relayed legal advice from IBM's corporate counsel. Id. The court held that
portion of the e-mail was covered by the privilege and thus not discoverable. Id. at *4,
9. The court did find, however, that "[a] portion of the [e-mail] communication at
issue here was clearly intended to be disclosed to persons outside the [attorney/client]
confidentiality ... and should be produced." Id. at *3-4. Accordingly, the court
granted Comdisco's motion to compel production of part of the e-mail message. Id. at
*4.
83. See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376, 1382, 1384 (7th Cir. 1993)
(upholding sanctions for failure to comply with discovery order requiring production
of computer data). Sanctions were also used in Armstrong v. Executive Office of the
President, 821 F. Supp. 761, 773 (D.D.C. 1993). To ensure that defendants would
comply with the court's order to restore backup tapes of e-mail records, the D.C.
District Court threatened fines of $50,000 per day, to be doubled in subsequent
weeks. Id. Fortunately for the defendants, these sanctions were later vacated by the
D.C. Circuit. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289-90
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
84. See generally Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Co., 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(entering judgment for plaintiff and imposing an attorney sanction because the de-
fendant destroyed records), aff'd, 775 F.2d 1440, 1454 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding
sanctions, but remanding "so that the district court may create a record accounting
for" the amount of the sanction).
85. FRCP 26(a)(1) provides that parties to litigation "shall, without awaiting a
discovery request, provide to other parties . . .(B) a copy of, or a description by
category and location of, all... data compilations ... in the possession, custody or
control of the party that are relevant to the disputed facts alleged with particularity in
the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
86. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B); see Shear, supra note 31, at 27.
87. The standard for discovery is more liberal than the admissibility standard. To
be discoverable, evidence need not be admissible, so long as it is reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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1. Employment Law Cases
Because of e-mail's increased usage in the workplace, more and
more employment law cases turn on some form of e-mail evidence.88
In Aviles v. McKenzie, 9 the plaintiff, a lab technician, used an e-mail
message to show that he was wrongfully discharged for his
whistleblowing activities.90 To establish his status as a whistleblower,
plaintiff introduced e-mail messages in which he reported "unsafe and
illegal practices"91 to his superiors. 92 In the e-mail messages, plaintiff
detailed the improper calibration of certain instruments and the lack
of proper supervision in other departments. 93 The court found that
the e-mail messages, coupled with other evidence, provided persua-
sive proof of wrongful discharge, and thus rejected defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion.'
E-mail evidence also played a key role in Strauss v. Microsoft
Corp.,95 another employment law case. In Strauss, the plaintiff
brought action against Microsoft for sexual discrimination in the
workplace. 6 As part of her case, plaintiff offered four separate e-mail
messages sent by her supervisor, each containing sexually suggestive
remarks.97 On two separate occasions, the Strauss court used the
e-mail evidence to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment.93
The court noted that the e-mail messages "could lead a reasonable
jury to conclude that, not only was Microsoft's reason for its [firing]
pretextual, but also that it failed to promote Strauss as a result of gen-
der discrimination." 99
Finally, in Boone v. Federal Express Corp.,100 the plaintiff offered
e-mail as proof that Federal Express conspired to discriminate against
him by refusing to train or promote him.'0 1 The e-mail messages con-
sisted of discussions regarding plaintiff's employment and retrain-
ing.1O2 Although the content of the messages did not provide
88. See Morris, supra note 19, at 574.
89. No. C-91-2013-DLJ, 1992 WL 715248 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1992).
90. Id at *2-3, 10.
91. Id. at *10.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. No. 91 Civ. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995) (denying
defendant's motion in ihnine to exclude e-mail evidence).
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id. at *4. The messages included a satirical essay entitled "Alice in UNIX
Land," a reference to "Mouse Balls," and a parody entitled "A Girl's Guide to Con-
doms." Id.
98. Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 856 F. Supp. 821, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Strauss v.
Microsoft Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1186, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
99. Strauss, 856 F. Supp. at 825.
100. 59 F3d 84 (8th Cir. 1995).
101. Id. at 87.
102. Id
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sufficient support for plaintiff's claim, the court did consider the
e-mail evidence. 10 3
2. Criminal Trials
E-mail has found its way into criminal courts as well.1°4 In Allen v.
State,105 the defendant was charged with the first-degree murder of his
wife.'" 6 To establish motive, the prosecutor attempted to show that
the defendant had been unfaithful to his wife and that their relation-
ship had deteriorated significantly.' 07 As part of that proof, the prose-
cutor introduced e-mail messages between the defendant and his
secretary, in which the defendant discussed the "most intimate"'' 0 of
his marital problems. 10 9 The trial court admitted the e-mail evidence
and the defendant was found guilty of murder."10 Upon review, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, pointing to the defendant's
prior affair with his secretary, held that the e-mail messages were ad-
missible as proof of defendant's motive for killing his wife."'
3. Defendants' Use of Electronic Communications
Prosecutors or plaintiffs are not the only litigants to use e-mail evi-
dence; defendants also have used e-mail and other electronically com-
municated messages to establish a defense. In United States v. Kim,"'
the defense offered telex evidence to rebut a charge of conspiracy to
defraud the United States. 13 E-mail served a similarly exculpatory
function in Plymouth Police Brotherhood v. Labor Relations Commis-
sion."4 There, the Plymouth Police Department was accused of im-
properly suspending an officer because he was a union president.'" 5
The defense countered that the officer was suspended for insubordina-
tion, and for conduct unbecoming a police officer.116 In support of its
103. 1l
104. Use of hearsay e-mail in a criminal case may run afoul of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which affords a criminal defendant the right to be
"confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Courts, how-
ever, have held that admitting hearsay under the business records exception does not
violate the Sixth Amendment if the accused has the opportunity to cross-examine the
custodial witness. See United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989); United States v. Peden, 556 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 871 (1977).
105. 862 P.2d 487 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1657 (1994).
106. Id. at 489.
107. Id. at 491.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 491, 493.
111. Id. at 491.
112. 95 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
113. Id. at 759.
114. 630 N.E.2d 599 (Mass. 1994).
115. Id. at 600.
116. Id. at 599.
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claim, the defense offered an e-mail message sent by the suspended
officer to fellow patrolmen.1 1 7 In the message, the officer referred to
town officials as "pigs, cheats, [and] liars."118 The court found it sig-
nificant that the defendant "sat at a computer terminal, and, with time
to reflect on his statements, transmitted demeaning comments over
the police department's computer network to fellow employees."119
Thus, as a direct result of the e-mail evidence, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the charges against the police department. 2 °
4. Challenges to Admissibility
The cases above illustrate the impact e-mail evidence can have on a
trial. As a result, opposing parties have attacked e-mail's admissibility
on various grounds. In Strauss, for example, the defendant used FREs
401,121 402,'2 and 40323 in an attempt to block the admission of dam-
aging e-mail messages. 24 Defendants argued that the messages were
"irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial to Microsoft and would confuse and
mislead the jury."'u The court disagreed, finding that the e-mail evi-
dence offered by the plaintiff was relevant to show pretext for failing
to promote the plaintiff, and that any prejudicial effect the e-mail
might have did not outweigh its probative value on the issue of
pretext126
Although all evidence must satisfy the requirements of FREs 402
and 403, e-mail evidence may face an additional challenge. E-mail, by
definition, is an out-of-court statement; 27 therefore, if e-mail evi-
dence is offered for the truth of what it asserts, it is likely to face an
objection on the grounds that it constitutes hearsay. 128 Two early
cases involving telex messages and a Ninth Circuit case involving
117. Id at 599-600.
118. Id at 600 n.2.
119. Id. at 602.
120. Id.
121. FRE 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence... more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401.
122. Under FRE 402, "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Fed. R.
Evid. 402.
123. FRE 403 gives judges discretion to exclude relevant evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury." Fed. R Evid. 403.
124. Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., No. 91 Civ. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 1995).
125. Id.
126. Id. at *4-5.
127. Although e-mail is in written form, a "statement" under the Federal Rules of
Evidence may be an "oral or written assertion." Fed. R. Evid. 801(a).
128. See Kotch, supra note 9, at 458-59 (noting that one of "the most specific barri-
ers to the admissibility of computer records [is] the hearsay rule"); infra note 149.
Note that not all proponents of e-mail evidence seek to use the content of message in
a hearsay fashion. For example, in Aviles v. McKenzie, No. C-91-2013-DLJ, 1992 WL
715248 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1992), the e-mail was not introduced to prove that the
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e-mail demonstrate the types of additional hurdles courts may place in
the way of admitting e-mail evidence.
In Michaels v. Michaels,129 plaintiff sought to prove that the defend-
ants were secretly using a broker to liquidate the assets of their
fledgling company. 130 Plaintiff's primary evidence consisted of three
telex messages between the broker and the defendants detailing the
broker's attempts to liquidate part of the company.' 3' The defendants
countered that the telex messages constituted inadmissible hearsay ev-
idence because the plaintiff offered them to prove that the defendants
were attempting to liquidate the company's assets. 32 The court found
that two of the messages were indeed hearsay; while the court
ultimately admitted one under a hearsay exception, it found that the
other did "not [fit] within any exception" and was thus
inadmissible. 133
In United States v. Kim,'3' a telex message contained a bank em-
ployee's statement regarding the bank's records of a deposit.135 The
court found that the message was an out-of-court statement, which
was being offered to prove the truth of what it asserted-that the de-
fendant made the deposit, and that bank records confirmed the trans-
action.' 36 Similarly in Monotype Corp. v. International Typeface
Corp.,1 3 7 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal to admit
an e-mail message on hearsay grounds.13 8
Michaels, Kim, and Monotype demonstrate that if electronic com-
munications evidence is to be offered at trial for the truth of what it
asserts, proponents of such evidence must overcome a hearsay chal-
lenge; failure to do so will likely result in the loss of valuable evidence.
If the e-mail is sent by a party opponent, it may be exempt from the
hearsay bar under FRE 801(d)(2). 39 If, however, the e-mail is sent by
working conditions were unsafe, but rather to show that the employee had made a
report alleging unsafe working conditions. Id at *10.
129. 767 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
130. Id. at 1201.
131. Id at 1201-02.
132. Id.
133. Id Because plaintiff established that the first hearsay message was a present
sense impression, it was admitted under FRE 803(1). Id. at 1201. The court ruled that
the third message was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and therefore
was not hearsay. Id
134. 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
135. Id. at 759.
136. Id.
137. 43 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 1994).
138. Id. at 450. For a more detailed discussion of the Monotype case, see infra part
III.A.2.
139. FRE 801(d)(2) exempts certain statements by party-opponents. Under FRE
801(d)(2), a statement is not hearsay if:
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own state-
ment, in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement
of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concern-
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nonparties, or if it is the proponent's own e-mail, FRE 801(d)(2) prob-
ably would not apply.1'0 Proponents of hearsay e-mail messages
therefore will need another way to overcome the hearsay bar to intro-
duce these e-mail messages. For proponents of traditional computer-
based documents, the most commonly used method of overcoming
hearsay objections is the business records exception. 4' As the cases
cited above suggest, a significant number of e-mail postings are sent
through message systems used by business organizations.' 2 Accord-
ingly, this Note focuses on one possible way of overcoming a hearsay
objection to e-mail evidence-the business records exception of FRE
803(6). To evaluate the admissibility of e-mail as a business record,
however, a preliminary examination of the hearsay rule and its excep-
tions is necessary.
II. HEARSAY, BusiNEss RECORDS, AND THE FEDERAL RuLES
OF EVIDENCE
In 1975, Congress promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence.143
The FREs apply to criminal and civil cases in federal courts, regard-
less of whether federal or state law supplies the rule of decision.'"
Over thirty states have adopted codes that closely track the FREs.145
ing the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning
a matter within the scope of the agency of employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
140. Such e-mail would not be considered a statement by a party-opponent, and
would thus fail to qualify under FRE 801(d)(2).
141. See Ronald L. Johnston, A Guide for the Proponent and Opponent of Com-
puter-Based Evidence, 1 Computer/LJ. 667, 669 (1979).
142. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
143. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. app. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The FREs were initially drafted by the
Supreme Court, and were later adopted by Congress. See Stephen A. Saltzburg et al.,
1 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 3-4 (6th ed. 1994). For an account of the Con-
gressional history of the FREs, see id. at 1-6.
144. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir.) (citing "many cases
holding that the [FREs] govern the admissibility of evidence in diversity cases"), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983).
145. See Alaska R. Evid. §§ 101-1103; Ariz. R. Evid. §§ 101-1103; Ark. Code Ann.
§§ 16-41-101 to 1102 (Mlihie 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 101-1103 (1984 & Supp.
1995); DeL R. Evid. §§ 101-1103; Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 90.101-.958 (West 1979 & Supp.
1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 621-6 (1993); Idaho R. Evid. §§ 101-1103; Iowa R. Evid.§§ 101-1103; La. Code Evid. Ann. §§ 101-1103 (West 1994); Me. R. Evid. §§ 101-1103;
Mich. R. Evid. §§ 101-1103; Minn. Stat. Ann. 50 §§ 101-1101 (West 1980 & Supp.
1996); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 13-1-1 to -153 (1972 & Supp. 1995); Mont. Code. Ann.§§ 26-10-101 to -1008 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-101 to -1103 (1989 & Supp. 1995);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47.020-52.395 (Michie 1995); N.H. R Evid. §§ 100-1103; N.J.
Stat. Ann. tit. 2A § 84A app. A (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-101 to -
102 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1 (1992 & Supp. 1995); N.D. R.
Evid. §§ 101-1103; Ohio R Evid. §§ 101-1103; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 2101-3103
(West 1993 & Supp. 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40.010-.585 (1991); ILL R. Evid.
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Even in states that have not adopted the FREs, opinions often cite
them and apply their underlying principles. 46
Under the FREs, only evidence proven "relevant" to the case is
admissible. 47 In practice, the relevance standard is not difficult to
satisfy. 48 A significantly more imposing obstacle to proponents of ev-
idence is the bar against hearsay evidence.
A. The Hearsay Bar
FRE 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' 49 FRE 801(a) notes
that a statement can be "an oral or written assertion."' 50 Addition-
ally, FRE 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pur-
suant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."''
The FREs disfavor hearsay because it avoids three fundamental de-
vices which maximize the accuracy of testimony before the trier of
fact: cross-examination of witnesses who testify at trial, the oath ad-
ministered to witnesses before they testify, and the opportunity for the
trier of fact to observe the demeanor of the testifying witnesses.15 2
Cross-examination has been called the "'greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.' ,,153 Unlike statements made in
court, hearsay statements are not immediately susceptible to cross-ex-
amination. As the Supreme Court noted:
The main danger in substituting subsequent for timely cross-exami-
nation seems to lie in the possibility that the witness' '(f)alse testi-
§§ 101-1008; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 19-9-1 to 18-8 (1995); Tenn. R. Evid.
§§ 101-1008; Tex. R. Civ. Evid. §§ 101-1008 and Tex. R. Crim. Evid. §§ 101-1101; Utah
R. Evid. §§ 101-1103; Vt. R. Evid. §§ 101-1103; Wash. R. Evid. §§ 101-1103; W.Va. R.
Evid. §§ 101-1102; Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 901.01-911.02 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); Wyo.
R. Evid. §§ 101-1103.
146. See, e.g., Illinois Educ. Relations Bd. v. Homer Community Consol. Sch. Dist.,
514 N.E.2d 465, 470 (IM. 1987) ("The Illinois Supreme Court has given substantial
deference to the Federal Rules of Evidence."); Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453
N.E.2d 1038, 1044 (Mass. 1983) (citing FRE 801(d)(1)(C)); Barbara C. Salken, To
Codify or Not to Codify-That is the Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to
Enact an Evidence Code, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 641, 694-95 & n.326 (1992) ("New York
courts frequently cite the Federal Rules when deciding evidence questions.").
147. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402.
148. See Glen Weissenberger, Weissenberger's Federal Evidence § 401.3 (2d ed.
1995). To be considered relevant, evidence need only make the existence of the fact
to be proved "more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
Fed. R. Evid. 401.
149. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). For a more in-depth examination of the hearsay bar
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Olin G. Wellborn III, The Definition of
Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 Tex. L. Rev 49 (1982).
150. Fed. R. Evid. 801(a).
151. Fed. R. Evid. 802.
152. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970) (citation omitted).
153. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (citing 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367).
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mony is apt to harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth
in proportion as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration and
influence by the suggestions of others, whose interest may be, and
often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth."54
Additionally, out-of-court statements are not usually made under
oath; hearsay declarants thus escape the threat of perjury, a measure
used to ensure accurate and honest testimony.1 5 5 Finally, out-of-court
statements are made outside the presence of the trier of fact, thereby
eliminating any possibility for the trier of fact to gauge the declarant's
demeanor.
156
Most hearsay statements involve two people: the hearsay declarant
who made the actual statement, and the individual who is relaying the
statement to the court.15 Because the hearsay declarant does not
normally relay hearsay statements to the court, and often significant
time has passed since the statements were made, hearsay poses addi-
tional risks of faulty perception, faulty memory, faulty narration, and
insincerity on the part of the declarant.' 58 With traditional testimony,
cross-examination can, and sometimes does, reveal insincerity and
narration problems, and may expose faulty perception and memory
on the part of the witness.1 59 With hearsay testimony, however, cross-
examination of the hearsay declarant is limited, if at all possible, and
the hearsay dangers16° thus persist.
Despite the bar against hearsay under the FREs, out-of-court state-
ments may still be admissible.161 Under FRE 803, Congress has listed
twenty-four hearsay exceptions which "are not excluded by the hear-
say rule." 6 Thus, a proponent of hearsay evidence has many alterna-
tive theories of admissibility from which to choose. This Note focuses
154. Id. at 159 (quoting State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939)); see also
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (noting that "no one, certainly no one ex-
perienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of cross-examination in expos-
ing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case").
155. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945) ("Statements made under [oath]
would have an important safeguard-the fear of prosecution for pejury.").
156. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (extolling the value of
"compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief").
157. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 245 (Practitioner Treatise Series, 4th ed. 1992).
158. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 185-88 (1948).
159. Id. at 188.
160. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
161. If the statement is not offered for the truth of what it asserts, it is not hearsay.
Examples include statements that are offered for their effect on the listener, state-
ments that have an independent legal significance, and statements offered for their
impeachment value only. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 4 Fed-
eral Evidence §§ 385-390 (1994).
162. See Fed. R. Evid. 803. The Federal Rules also exclude from the hearsay defini-
tion certain prior statements by witnesses, and certain admissions by party opponents.
See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d). Additionally, FRE 804(b) provides five other hearsay ex-
1996] 2303
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
upon only those instances where other exceptions to the hearsay bar
are not applicable, and where the most viable means for the admission
of e-mail evidence is to characterize it as a business record.
B. The Business Records Exception Under FRE 803(6)
Under the FREs, business records that are hearsay may nonetheless
be admissible if they satisfy the requirements detailed in FRE 803(6),
commonly known as the "business records exception.' 163
1. Policies Behind the Exception
The business records exception is derived from the common law
doctrine of the "shop book rule."'" The rule allowed courts to admit
into evidence journal entries made by tradesmen and craftsmen as
proof of debts for goods or services rendered. 65 By the nineteenth
century, the rule was firmly rooted, and courts extended the rule to
include entries made by all persons, since deceased, provided that
they were made in the ordinary course of business. 1 66 In 1936, Con-
gress enacted a version of the rule for the federal courts. 67 The rule
remained in effect until 1975, when it was repealed by the FREs.168
The business records exception rests on two policies: necessity and
trustworthiness. 1 69 The necessity for the exception arises from the
complexity of modem business. Most business records are often
"composite[s] of information gleaned from many sources.' 1 70 By cre-
ating a hearsay exception, Congress obviated the need for courts to
take testimony from multiple witnesses, each of whom would add only
narrow points on the matters asserted within the hearsay document. 17
The trustworthiness factor stems from businesses' reliance on their
own records. "[M]arket pressure," "individual responsibility for job
performance," and the "regularity of business and recordmaking,"
combine to "assure a kind of expertise and reduce risks of mistake" in
business records.' T As one commentator noted, evidence under FRE
ceptions if the hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. See Fed. R. Evid.
804(b).
163. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
164. See McCormick, supra note 157, § 285.
165. See id
166. Id
167. See The Federal Business Records Act of 1936, 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (repealed
1975).
168. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1949 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
169. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, § 444, at 486.
170. Id
171. IL
172. Id; see also Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) advisory committee's note ("The element of
unusual reliability of business records is said variously to be supplied by systematic
checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, [or] by ac-
tual experience of businesses in relying upon them.... ."); Weissenberger, supra note
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803(6) is considered "presumptively reliable."'" Although critics of
the business records exception may argue that self-interest often af-
fects the preparation of business documents, as one judge countered,
"there is hardly a grocer's account book which could not be excluded
on that basis."' 74 As an added precaution against such self-interest,
however, Congress allowed judges to exclude business records if their
origins "indicate [a] lack of trustworthiness."17
2. Requirements of 803(6)
As the Rule suggests, not all business records qualify under FRE
803(6). The requirements of the business records exception consist of
five elements:17 6 (1) the record must be kept in the course of a regu-
larly conducted business activity; (2) the particular record at issue
must be one that is regularly kept; (3) the record must be made by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of the
source; (4) the record must be made contemporaneously; (5) the rec-
ord must be accompanied by foundation testimony.' 77 These require-
ments are discussed below.
To qualify under FRE 803(6), the record must be made in the
course of a "regularly conducted business activity.' 178 This require-
ment helps ensure the trustworthiness of the record, which is the
premise upon which the business records exception is based. 79 The
Federal Rules Committee believed that records made outside the
course of regular business activities lacked sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness.180 "If... the supplier of the information does not act
148, § 803.29, at 477 (noting that "businesses can function only if they have accurate
records and consequently businesses promote environments which ensure accuracy").
173. Lucy S. McGough, Child Witnesses: Fragile Voices in the American Legal
System 130 (1994).
174. Hoffnan v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 1002 (2d Cir. 1942) (Clark, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). Citing Palmer, the advisory committee to the FREs noted,
"that records might be self-serving has not been a ground for exclusion." Fed. P.
Evid. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
175. Fed. P. Evid. 803(6). For example, records made solely in anticipation of liti-
gation, if not routinely made, may fail to qualify under 803(6). See Clark v. Los Ange-
les, 650 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). The
argument against admitting records made under such circumstances is that the trust-
worthiness of the document would be suspect. As the Supreme Court noted, exten-
sion of the exception to this category of records would lead to "a real perversion of a
rule designed to facilitate admission of [business] records which experience has shown
to be quite trustworthy." Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943) (applying the
pre-FREs version of the business records exception).
176. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, § 445.
177. Id.
178. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Under FRE 803(6), the term "business" broadly in-
cludes "business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit." Id.
179. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
180. H.PL Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7087.
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in the regular course, an essential link is broken."'' Accordingly,
records that are of a personal nature do not fall within the
exception.18
Secondly, FRE 803(6) states that the business must make the record
as part of its "regular practice.' 1 83 The rationale for this requirement
is similar to the "regular course" requirement; a record that is made
on a regular basis is likely to be more accurate, and hence, more trust-
worthy.1' Of course, the term "regular practice" is not defined in the
FREs, and is thus open to interpretation. For example, the First Cir-
cuit has held that a catalog, printed only once a year, satisfied the
regularity requirement under FRE 803(6).185 The Eleventh Circuit
has taken an equally liberal view of the regularity requirement, noting
that the language of FRE 803(6) was worded to avoid "'a ten-
dency unduly to emphasize a requirement of routineness and
repetitiveness.' "1186
A third requirement is that the record must have been made by a
"person with knowledge" of the information contained in it'-
"[t]hat is, the information recorded must have originated with some-
one who had first-hand knowledge thereof."'" Many courts have
broadly construed this requirement. For example, the person who
physically makes the record need not have first-hand knowledge of
the information contained within the record. 189 Even if the person
whose first-hand knowledge was the basis for the record cannot be
identified, the record may qualify under FRE 803(6). 19° Moreover,
the requirement of personal knowledge may be met even where the
record was prepared by someone not acting under a business duty,
181. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
182. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, § 445, at 491.
183. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
184. McCormick, supra note 157, § 286.
185. United States v. Grossman, 614 F.2d 295, 297 (1st Cir. 1980).
186. United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1537-38 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed.
R. Evid. 803(6) advisory committee's note), cert denied, 507 U.S. 920 (1993).
187. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
188. White Indus. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(citations omitted).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 784 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting
that FRE 803(6) "does not require personal knowledge of the maker of the record as
a condition precedent to its admission into evidence"). See generally Lewis v. Baker,
526 F.2d 470, 474 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying the Federal Business Records Act).
190. See United States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1978). In the Sen-
ate Report accompanying the FRE, it was noted that: "It is the understanding of the
committee that the use of the phrase 'person with knowledge' is not intended to imply
that the party seeking to introduce the [evidence] must be able to produce, or even
identify, the specific individual upon whose first-hand knowledge the [evidence] was
based." S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7063.
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provided that the record was verified by someone who was acting
under a business duty.191
Additionally, the record must be made "at or near the time" the
information was obtained, although this too is subject to somewhat
liberal interpretation. No bright-line rule governs what is considered
timely, and courts are free to exercise discretion in evaluating the facts
of each case.'9 In one recent case the Seventh Circuit upheld the
admissibility of a record made eleven days after the events which it
reported had transpired. 93 By contrast, courts have rejected records
made more than one or two months after the information was
obtained.
94
3. Foundation and Authentication Issues under 803(6)
FRE 803(6) requires the testimony of the "custodian" of the infor-
mation, or some "other qualified witness," before the document may
be admitted under the Rule.195 The purpose of the custodian witness
is to lay the foundation for the business records exception by detailing
the recordkeeping practices of the business. "Such testimony estab-
lishes the regular practices and procedures surrounding the creation of
the records, the very elements that are necessary for a finding of trust-
worthiness. 19 6 The witness supplying this "foundation" testimony
need not be the person who made the record and need not have first-
hand knowledge about the document's content.197 Accordingly, any
witness with general knowledge about the organization's recordkeep-
ing process may testify that the record satisfies the other requirements
of FRE 803(6).198 In fact, the witness need not have been in the com-
pany's employment at the time the record was made, so long as she
191. See, e.g., United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1989) (al-
lowing admission of hotel registration prepared by guest where hotel employee was
required to verify record).
192. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Austin, 292 F.2d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 1961) ("[Timeli-
ness] is not to be judged, then, by arbitrary or artificial time limits, measured by hours
or days or even weeks." (applying the Federal Business Records Act)).
193. See Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796, 804 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 914
(1992). But see Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students Int'l Meditation Soe'y, 501 F2d 550,
554 (1st Cir. 1974) (excluding records made one week after the information contained
therein was first reported).
194. See Willco Kuwait Trading S.A.K. v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 628 (1st Cir.
1988) (rejecting a record made approximately three months after the event); Missouri
Par., 292 F.2d at 423 (rejecting a record made 14 months after the information was
obtained).
195. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
196. United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
197. See e.g., FDIC v. Staudinger, 797 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that
"there is no requirement that the party offering a business record produce the author
of the item"); Wables, 731 F.2d at 449 ("The business records exception to the hear-
say rule clearly does not require that the witness have personal knowledge of the
entries in the records.").
198. Wables, 731 F.2d at 449 ("The witness need only have knowledge of the proce-
dures under which the records were created.").
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can establish the recordkeeping practices employed during the rec-
ord's creation.' 99 Moreover, if a document is not admitted under FRE
803(6) for want of a "foundation witness" the document may still
qualify under FRE 803(24).00
4. Types of Records Covered by FRE 803(6)
Because of the Rule's derivation from the "shop book" exception,
the term "business records" conjures up images of accounting ledgers,
inventory lists, and sales receipts. In practice, FRE 803(6) has a much
wider scope, and courts have applied it to a variety of records, includ-
ing certificates of insurance,20 ' annual corporate reports,2°2 radio tele-
grams sent to a cargo ship,20 3 and scrapbooks of newspaper
articles .21  To date, no federal court has explicitly extended the excep-
tion to e-mail.20 5 Courts have, however, held that FRE 803(6) applies
to two types of records with which e-mail is commonly associated-
computer documents 20 6 and letters or general memoranda. 20 7
C. Computer-Based Records Under the Business Records Exception
FRE 803(6) explicitly encompasses "data compilation[s], '08 and
records in "any form."209 The advisory committee's note to FRE
803(6) points out that "[t]he expression 'data compilation' is used as
broadly descriptive of any means of storing information other than
conventional words and figures in written or documentary form. It
includes, but is by no means limited to, electronic computer stor-
age. 210 The Senate Committee's report on the FRE also implicitly
recognized that computer-based records fall under the Rule.2 '
199. See United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
870 (1978); United States v. Rose, 562 F.2d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 1977).
200. See United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 670-72 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 393 (1993); United States v. Hitsman, 604 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1979).
FRE 803(24) provides a catchall exception for evidence "not specifically covered by
any of the [hearsay] exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 803(24). In addition to the foundation requirement of
803(6), FRE 901 requires that all documents be authenticated before they can be
admitted. See Fed. R. Evid. 901. The purpose of FRE 901 is to establish the "connec-
tion between the evidence offered and the relevant facts of the case." Weissenberger,
supra note 148, § 901.1, at 613.
201. See United States v. Albert, 773 F.2d 386, 388-89 (1st Cir. 1985).
202. See United States v. Ragano, 520 F.2d 1191, 1200 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 905 (1976).
203. United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1413 (3d Cir. 1994).
204. United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246, 1252 (6th Cir. 1977).
205. See infra part III.
206. See infra part II.C.
207. See infra part II.D.
208. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
209. Id
210. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
211. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
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Because of Congress' clear mandate, a wealth of case law exists al-
lowing computer-based records into court under the business records
exception. In fact, nearly every federal circuit court has admitted
computer-based records under FRE 803(6).21 - Even courts applying
the pre-FREs Federal Business Records Act have recognized that a
computer document could qualify as a business record.213 Federal
courts have applied FRE 803(6) to a wide variety of computer-based
information, including computerized copies of phone bills indicating
outgoing calls,2W 1 4 records of banking transactions,215 and Lotus
spreadsheets.216
Courts analyzing computer-based evidence under FRE 803(6) have
generally held that, although a computerized recordkeeping medium
is used, the standard requirements of FRE 803(6) are prerequisites for
admissibility. The Ninth Circuit stressed this point in United States v.
Catabran,21 7 a case in which computer-generated ledgers, inventory,
and payroll records were admitted under the business records excep-
tion.218 In its analysis, the court noted that "it is immaterial that the
business record is maintained in a computer rather than in company
books," provided that the proponent of the evidence lays a proper
foundation.219 The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar stance in Rosenberg
v. Collins' 0 stating: "Under Rule 803(6), computer data compila-
212. A survey of federal circuit court decisions reveals that all but three circuits-
the Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits-have admitted computer-based documents
under FRE 803(6). See Professional Mobile Home Brokers, Inc. v. Security Pac.
Hous. Serv., No. 94-1910, 1995 WL 255937 (4th Cir. May 3, 1995); United States v.
Goodchild, 25 F.3d 55, 61-62 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1156 (1995); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d
1476, 1494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990); United States v. Lawrence, No.
88-2056, 1989 WL 153161, at *9 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019
(1990); United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Glasser, 773 F2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 89-90
(5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1124-25 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977). Additionally, the Second Circuit implicitly acknowledged
that computer-based records could satisfy the requirements of FRE 803(6). See
Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp., 38 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 1994)
("A business record may include data stored electronically on computers and later
printed out for presentation in court, so long as the 'original computer data compila-
tion was prepared pursuant to a business duty in accordance with regular business
practice.'" (quoting United States v. Hemandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1512-13 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 908 (1991))).
213. See United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1240-41 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974).
214. See United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1982).
215. See United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1156 (1995).
216. See Ameropan Oil Corp. v. Monarch Air Serv., No. 92 C 3450, 1994 WL 86701,
at *3-4 (N.D. IlL Mar. 16, 1994).
217. 836 F.2d 453, 457-58 (9th Cir. 1988).
218. Id. at 456-58.
219. Id. at 457 (citation omitted).
220. 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980).
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tions... should be treated as any other record of regularly conducted
activity."'" In admitting computer-based records of cash transfers,
the court applied the requirements of FRE 803(6) without
modification. '
Although computerized information is subject to the same require-
ments as all other business records, unique issues arise, and "[s]ome
accommodation is required because of differences between the con-
ventional account book and the electronic medium of the com-
puter. ''11 3 Offering proof of computer-based records poses one such
wrinkle; whereas traditional records exist on paper and are easily of-
fered in court, computer-based records generally exist on electronic-
storage media, such as hard drives, mainframes, or tape backups. To
facilitate admissibility, courts have held that hardcopy printouts of
computer-based records are admissible,224 even if the printouts them-
selves were prepared solely for litigation purposes.22
Whether computer-based records satisfy the timeliness require-
ments of FRE 803(6) may also prove to be problematic. Questions
may arise as to whether the computer record needs to be created "at
or near the time" the underlying information was obtained, or if it is
sufficient that the underlying information itself was memorialized in a
timely fashion. At least one court has held that the timeliness require-
ment of FRE 803(6) is satisfied if the proponent of the evidence can
show that the original information was recorded near the time of the
event, even if it was entered into the computer much later.2 6
Additionally, computer-based records may raise unique issues re-
garding foundation testimony and exactly who may qualify as a foun-
dation witness. The legislative history of FRE 803(6) indicates that
"[a] sufficient foundation for the introduction of such evidence will be
laid.., in the case of a computer printout, upon a report from the
company's computer programmer or one who has knowledge of the
particular record system." 7 Accordingly, courts have held that the
221. ld. at 665 (citation omitted).
222. Id.
223. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, § 446, at 509.
224. FRE 1001(3) notes: "If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any
printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an
'original.'" Fed. R. Evid. 1001(3).
225. See United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1512-13 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 908 (1991); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 n.13 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990); United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1019-
20 (5th Cir. 1987). Note that the exception may not apply if the record itself was
prepared solely in anticipation of litigation. See supra note 175 and accompanying
text.
226. See United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 197-99 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing
admission of computerized records of Medicaid claim forms where the data contained
in the forms was recorded in a timely fashion).
227. S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7063-64 (emphasis added).
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proponent need not call to the stand the programmer responsible for
the computer software.' As with traditional documents, the maker
of the record need not testify as the foundation witness.1 9
Invariably, in the age of computer hackers, data security issues are
also likely to be raised as an obstacle to the admission of computer
evidence. Nonetheless, according to the Eleventh Circuit, "The exist-
ence of an air-tight security system is not .. a prerequisite to the
admissibility of computer printouts. If such a prerequisite did exist, it
would become virtually impossible to admit computer generated
records."''z 0 Such issues will go to the weight of the evidence, rather
than its admissibility- 3 1 Moreover, if the requirements of the FRE
806(3) have been satisfied, a rebuttable presumption of the docu-
ment's accuracy results.3 2
D. Memoranda and Correspondence Under the Business
Records Exception
In addition to encompassing computer-based records, FRE 803(6)
also applies to a "memorandum. ' '1 33 While the term lacks explicit def-
inition in the advisory committee's notes, courts have admitted vari-
ous types of correspondence under FRE 803(6).
In Gibbs v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,' the Ninth Circuit
held that FRE 803(6) applied to an interoffice memo regarding the
status of an insurance claim.235 In admitting the evidence, the court
found it sufficient that "State Farm's 'regular practice' [included] pre-
paring memoranda relating to a claim and... circulating them among
its departments."" 6 In Brown v. ASD Computing Center,37 the court
held FRE 803(6) applicable to a warning letter from a supervisor to an
employee83s The letter included concerns over the employee's per-
228. See United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) ("It is not
necessary that the computer programmer testify in order to authenticate computer-
generated records."); United States v. Young Bros., Inc., 728 F2d 682, 693-94 (5th
Cir.) (rejecting claim that computer programmer is required to lay foundation for
computer evidence before it may be admitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984). In
practice, courts minimally require the testimony of someone familiar with the busi-
ness' computerized recordkeeping practices. See Miller, 771 F.2d at 1237.
229. See United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1975).
230. United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing admis-
sion of computerized bank records despite the fact that teller numbers used to access
the system were not kept confidential).
231. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977).
232. See United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 909 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Snyder, 787 F.2d 1429, 1433-34 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 836 (1986).
233. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
234. 544 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1976).
235. Id at 428.
236. Id.
237. 519 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
238. Id. at 1103 n.2.
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formance, and gave her sixty days to improve.239 The court consid-
ered the letter hearsay proof that the employee was deficient in the
areas listed, or that she was later fired for failing to correct those defi-
ciencies.2" The court admitted the letter under FRE 803(6) for pur-
poses of summary judgment, but conditioned admission on
subsequent authentication.24 Nevertheless, the court remarked on
the relative "ease with which [the] Defendant should be able to com-
ply with Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). "1242
While Gibbs and Brown reflect a judicial acceptance of letters and
interoffice correspondence under the business records exception, the
requirements of FRE 803(6) must still be satisfied before the admis-
sion of such evidence under the Rule.24 3 As with computer-based
records, recurring issues arise in the application of FRE 803(6) to in-
teroffice memos and correspondence.
Memoranda and correspondence often are more informal and more
sporadically generated than the "account books" for which the excep-
tion was first established.2 4 As a result, these types of records will
often have difficulty meeting the "regularly conducted business activ-
ity" and the "regularly kept record" requirements of FRE 803(6).
For example, the D.C. Circuit refused to apply the exception to a
memo sent to an employee from the head of her division.245 Although
the memo concerned the employee's work arrangements, the court
held that the "memorandum was not a record of a regularly conducted
business activity. 246 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc.,2 the
Fifth Circuit similarly held that a questionnaire letter sent to a client
did not satisfy the "regularly conducted business activity" require-
ment.2' The court found it dispositive that the client's regular busi-
ness practice did not include the completion of the questionnaire.24 9
The "regularly conducted" requirement also served as an obstacle to
239. Id. at 1103.
240. 1a
241. Id. at 1098.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp.
1190, 1232 (E.D. Penn. 1980) (dismissing numerous interoffice memos as "casual and
informal in nature").
245. See Langon v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1055,
1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
246. Id. at 1060. Note that in requiring the memo to be "a record of a regularly
conducted business activity" instead of one "kept in course of a regularly conducted
business activity," the court applies a test that is somewhat different than that re-
quired by FRE 803(6). See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text. Unfortu-
nately, the court offered no explanation for the distinction, nor why the record itself
failed to qualify.
247. 855 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988).
248. Id. at 238.
249. Id.
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admission in Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc.250 There, the D.C.
District Court considered two letters which alluded to the group's re-
lationship with the Irish Northern Aid Committee, which allegedly
had ties to the Irish Republican Army.25 The court held that the
maker was under no business duty to report the information, and
therefore the letters were not admissible under FRE 803(6). 2 - Fi-
nally, if the memo is "drafted in response to unusual or 'isolated'
events,"'"2 3 courts may be reluctant to find that it was made in the
course of a regular business activity.' -
Nonetheless, as the Seventh Circuit noted, "Although interoffice
memoranda are sometimes excluded where they are not created in the
course of regularly conducted business activity... they are, not sur-
prisingly, admissible where they are created in the regular course of
business."''2a Accordingly, a diverse range of business-related corre-
spondence has been admitted under FRE 803(6) in nearly all circuit
courts, including the Second,2 6 Fourth,2s7 Fifth,2 8 Sixth,2 5 Sev-
enth,' Ninth," 1 and Eleventh Circuits.262
Moreover, some courts have taken a more expansive view of the
regularity requirements, admitting memoranda under FRE 803(6)
even where the company keeping the records did not create the docu-
ment. The Ninth Circuit held that FRE 803(6) applied to correspon-
dence received by a business from a client, as it was "received by [the
250. 595 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 796 F.2d 520
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
251. Id. at 116, 119-20.
252. Id. at 120. The court did, however, admit the letters under FRE 803(24). Id.
253. United States v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing United States
v. Freidin, 849 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1988)).
254. Id.
255. United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 694 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1183 (1986).
256. See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 23 (2d Cir. 1979) (allowing admission
of a corporate memorandum ordering a fund transfer), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082
(1980).
257. See Snuffer v. Motorist Mut. Ins., No. 86-1725, 1987 WL 44776, at *1-2, 4 n.2
(4th Cir. Sept. 9, 1987) (admitting correspondence to a supervisor detailing a "possi-
ble" insurance claim).
258. See United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d 1522, 1528-29 (5th Cir.) (upholding ad-
mission of a letter requesting payment for an outstanding debt), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
921 (1985).
259. See United States v. LaValley, 957 F.2d 1309, 1314 (6th Cir.) (upholding admis-
sion of letters barring protesters from entering military base), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
972 (1992).
260. See United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 694 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding
admission of reports prepared by another organization, but regularly received in the
course of business), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1183 (1986).
261. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
262. See Haygood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1993)
(finding that correspondence from attorney to client informing him of an impending
foreclosure action was erroneously excluded).
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insurance company] in the ordinary course of business 2 63 The Sev-
enth Circuit applied similar reasoning in admitting several interde-
partmental memos, along with a letter between two businesses,
pursuant to FRE 803(6).264 In discussing the regularity requirements,
the court stated: "Letters created by another business but regularly
received, maintained and relied upon ... as was demonstrated here,
may also constitute admissible business records ... ,"265
III. ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCE UNDER THE BUSINESS
RECORDS EXCEPTION
Despite the fact that FRE 803(6) has been extended to include both
interoffice memos and computer-based data, the Rule has not yet
been extended to e-mail. As two noted commentators have observed,
"There is neither a formal nor principled reason why e[-]mail
messages could not satisfy the exception. '266 Professors Mueller and
Kirkpatrick share the view of some courts, however, that e-mail "in
its most common use seems close to the telephone in [its] casual and
spontaneous informality, and far removed from systematic and perma-
nent recordkeeping."' 67 Unless e-mail were adapted to "permanent
and more systematic recordkeeping purposes," Professors Mueller
and Kirkpatrick add, e-mail messages will "fail to satisfy the 'regular
practice' requirement of the exception and the casual nature of such
messages surely raises trustworthiness concerns under FRE
803(6). '' r
This part argues that under modem business practice, e-mail has
become a permanent and systematic recordkeeping function in many
organizations, including the federal government. While trustworthi-
ness is a concern in determining the admissibility of any business doc-
ument, many types of e-mail messages can satisfy the explicit
requirements of FRE 803(6), as well as the policies behind the Rule.
A. Judicial Reluctance to Accept E-mail As a Business Record
Under FRE 803(6)
E-mail evidence in many federal cases, such as those cited in part
I.C above, has either not been challenged on hearsay grounds, or has
been admitted under some other hearsay exception.2 69 To date, no
federal court has applied the business records exception to e-mail
messages. One federal circuit court has gone so far as to reject e-mail
263. See Deland v. Old Republic Life Ins., 758 F.2d 1331, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985).
264. See United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 692-94 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1183 (1986).
265. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
266. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, § 446, at 45 (Supp. 1995).
267. 1d
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text; supra note 128.
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as a recordkeeping medium entirely.270 While e-mail's admissibility
under FRE 803(6) is a relatively new issue, the admissibly of elec-
tronic messages under FRE 803(6) has been litigated in the context of
telex messages, the technological predecessor to e-mail.2 71
1. Telex Cases
One of the earliest cases to consider the telex issue was United
States v. Kim.2' Kim involved a hearsay challenge to a bank telex
message offered by the defense. 2 3 The defense asserted that the telex
fell under FRE 803(6) and should be admitted.2 74 The court refused
to admit the telex under FRR 803(6) for three reasons. First, the telex
failed the "timeliness" requirement, in that it was prepared over two
years after the act it reported.2 75 Second, the telex failed the "regular
activity" requirement, in that the transaction underlying the telex was
the first kind in the bank's history.2 76 Finally, the telex was not "trust-
worthy," because it was inconsistent with other evidence.2 ' In short,
the court held that FRE 803(6) was inapplicable to the telex because
of the content of the message, and the because of the untrustworthy
circumstances surrounding its preparation.
Other federal courts have followed the D.C. Circuit's lead in refus-
ing to admit telex messages under FRE 803(6).278 By contrast, the
Third and Eighth Circuits have extended FRE 803(6) to include telex
messages. In United Sates v. Gregg,279 the Eighth Circuit held that
telex messages between an exporter and his clients satisfied the re-
quirements of FRE 803(6). 2s In admitting the records, the court
noted "[t]he status of the telexes as records 'kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity.' "28
Similarly, in United States v. Reilly s28 the Third Circuit held that
telex messages to a cargo ship qualified as business records under
FRE 803(6).3 At trial, the district court rejected the admission of
270. See infra part ILI.A.2.
271. See supra notes 26-27.
272. 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
273. Id. at 759.
274. Id. at 760.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 761.
277. Id. at 762-63.
278. See, e.g., Willco Kuwait Trading S.A.K. v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 628 (1st Cir.
1988) (rejecting admission of telex under FRE 803(6) partly because of trustworthi-
ness concerns); Central Oil Co. v. M/V Lamna-Forest, 821 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1987)
(upholding district court's rejection of telex under FRE 803(6)); United States v.
Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting telex from DEA agent because
"telexes of this sort are not business records and contain many inaccuracies").
279. 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
280. Id. at 1433, 1440.
281. Id. at 1440 (quoting Fed. R Evid. 803(6)).
282. 33 F.3d 1396 (3d Cir. 1994).
283. Id. at 1413-14.
1996] 2315
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
telex messages because they lacked trustworthiness.284 The Third Cir-
cuit, reversing the decision, focused less on the fact that the messages
were telexes and more on the content of the messages and the context
in which the messages were made.285 In its analysis, the court found
persuasive the custodial witness who "'demonstrate[d] that the
records ...[of the radiotelegrams] were made contemporaneously
with the act the documents purport[ed] to record by someone with
knowledge of the subject matter, that they were made in the regular
course of business, and that such records were regularly kept by the
business.' ", 286 As further support, the foundation witness detailed the
procedures by which the messages were transmitted, received, docu-
mented, and stored.287 Based on this information, the Third Circuit
held the messages to be admissible.288 While telex messages have
been rejected under FRE 803(6) just as frequently as they have been
admitted, these cases demonstrate that electronically communicated
messages are capable of meeting the requirements of FRE 803(6).
2. Rejection of E-mail As a Business Record
One of the first federal cases to analyze e-mail evidence under FRE
803(6) was Rick v. Toyota Industrial Equipment Co." 9 In Rick, the
court considered the admissibility of an e-mail inventory list under
FRE 803(6).2g The court rejected the record because it was prepared
in anticipation of litigation, and was neither made in a timely fashion,
nor by someone with knowledge.29' In applying the test of FRE
803(6), however, the court implicitly acknowledged that e-mail could
qualify as a record under the business records exception if the require-
ments of the Rule were satisfied.
Although the door to admitting e-mail under FRE 803(6) was left
open by Rick, it was effectively slammed shut by the Ninth Circuit in
Monotype Corp. v. International Typeface Corp. 2  Monotype in-
volved charges that Monotype Corp., a typeface designer, illegally
copied ten printing fonts which were owned by International Typeface
Corporation ("ITC"). 293 ITC alleged that Monotype intended to sell
the fonts to Microsoft for use in Microsoft's software.294 Part of ITC's
proof was an interoffice e-mail message between employees of
284. ld. at 1431 (Garth, J. dissenting).
285. 1& at 1413-14.
286. Id. at 1414 (citation omitted).
287. 1l
288. Id.
289. No. 93 C 1331, 1994 WL 484633 (N.D. ill Sept. 2, 1994).
290. Id at *6, 7 n.4.
291. 1l at *6.
292. 43 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 1994).
293. Id at 447-48.
294. Id at 448.
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Microsoft, who was not party to the suit.295 The message acknowl-
edged that some of the fonts "'are not legitimate versions.' "296 The
e-mail further noted that Microsoft should proceed with caution 9
ITC sought to use this e-mail as proof that Monotype improperly used
its designs.298
Monotype countered that the message was hearsay, and thus inad-
missible. To overcome the hearsay objection, ITC argued that the
e-mail was admissible as a business record under FRE 803(6).2" ITC
pointed out that the e-mail was merely a project report to a superior, a
regularly conducted business activity at Microsoft.? ITC also argued
that it was the regular practice of Microsoft employees to make such
records in e-mail form. 01 Finally, ITC showed that the employee
making the record had personal knowledge about the Microsoft-Mon-
otype transaction, and that the message was made in a timely fash-
ion.3° In further support of its position, ITC cited United States v.
Catabran,30 3 a Ninth Circuit case admitting computer-based records
under FRE 803(6). s°
Despite ITC's showing that the e-mail satisfied the requirements of
FRE 803(6), the court refused to admit the e-mail evidence3 5 The
court distinguished Catabran, noting that "[e]-mail is far less of a sys-
tematic business activity than a monthly inventory printout."3 16 The
court added that "[e]-mail is an ongoing electronic message and re-
trieval system whereas an electronic inventory recording system is a
regular, systematic function of a bookkeeper prepared in the course of
business. 307
The Monotype decision is troubling for several reasons. First, it re-
jects the application of FRE 803(6) in perfunctory fashion; the opinion
spends only two sentences analyzing the merits of the e-mail message
as a business record.308 More importantly, the Monotype court fo-
cused nearly exclusively on the medium used to create the record-
e-mail-at the expense of two crucial elements of the business records
exception: the content of the record and the business context in which
295. Id. at 450.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. 836 F.2d 453, 457-58 (9th Cir. 1988).
304. See Monotype, 43 F.3d at 450. For a more detailed discussion of Catabran, see
supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
305. Monotype, 43 F.3d at 450.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
1996] 2317
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
it was made. °9 The court's assertion that the report was not a "regu-
lar, systematic function" was inconsistent with the evidence ITC of-
fered, which showed that these type of reports were a regular activity
for Microsoft employees.3 10 In effect, the court evaluated e-mail in
the abstract, rather than in the context of Microsoft's business prac-
tices, as FRE 803(6) requires. 311 By offering a blanket rejection of all
e-mail under FRE 803(6), regardless of the manner in which it is used
in an organization,312 the Monotype court created an unjustified cate-
gorical rule.
B. E-mail As a Regularly Kept Record, Made in the Course of a
Regularly Conducted Business Activity
The rejection of e-mail as a business record by the Monotype court
centered on two notions: (1) e-mail is not a regularly kept record;313
and (2) the e-mail record was not made as part of a regularly con-
ducted activity. 314 Such analysis invariably turns on the practices of
the particular organization.315 Nonetheless, an analysis of modern
business practices strongly suggests that in at least some organizations,
e-mail would qualify under FRE 803(6). This part argues that in the
context of many modern business practices, e-mail, like other forms of
computer storage, is a medium capable of providing regular, system-
atic recordkeeping, as required by FRE 803(6). This part further ar-
gues that analysis of the content of many e-mail messages reveals that
e-mail also frequently contains information "kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity., 31 6
1. E-mail Systems are Capable of Systematic Recordkeeping
The rapid expansion of e-mail has completely reshaped how corpo-
rations "regularly" conduct business 317 and keep records. A recent
survey of Fortune 100 companies shows that nearly nine out of ten
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. By contrast, the Kim court pro-
vided a detailed analysis of the telex, applying the requirements of FRE 803(6) to
creation of the telex and the business practices of the bank involved. United States v.
Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 760-63 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
312. See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, § 446, at 45 (Supp. 1995) ("In a
case of first impression, a panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that [eJ-mail messages
do not fit the business records exception."); E-mail Meets F.R.E. 803(6), Fed. Lit.,
June 1995, at 122 (interpreting Monotype as disregarding all e-mail under FRE
803(6)).
313. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
316. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
317. See Jim Carroll, Internet Expected to be Backbone of Global Business, Com-
puting Canada, Jan. 18, 1995, at 27 ("[I]t is a fact that a lot of inter-organizational
communications already occur through Internet e-mail, and hence are already chang-
ing business as we know it."); Albert J. Enzweiler, Improving the Financial Reporting
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"currently use e-mail for person-to-person communications, [and]
about two-thirds use e-mail for publication dissemination. '318 E-mail
has not only changed the way businesses communicate, it has also af-
fected the way they keep records.3 19 The staggering volume of corpo-
rate e-mail was highlighted during Intuit Inc.'s recent merger with
Microsoft. When Intuit sought to comply with the Justice Depart-
ment's electronic data request, the company found some 80,000 e-mail
records archived on system databases. 2° Faced with a similar discov-
ery request, CIBA-Geigy had at least thirty million pages of e-mail
stored on back-up tapes. 32'
E-mail use is also becoming more regulated and more systematic in
modern business practice. Companies that regularly use e-mail in
place of paper reports, and that make daily business decisions on the
basis of such reports, have policies to regulate when and how the
e-mail messages are made and stored. In April 1994, the San Jose
Mercury News conducted an informal survey of e-mail policies at
nearly twenty corporations, including Intel, Hewlett-Packard, and
Consolidated Freightways. 322 All but four had either written policies
or formal guidelines covering e-mail usage, storage, and retrieval.323
These policies cover issues ranging from how long e-mail should be
stored, to when it should be used.324 Additionally, many commenta-
tors are urging attorneys to advise their clients to institute e-mail re-
cordkeeping and retention policies.315
The federal government, recognizing the emergence of e-mail as a
recordkeeping device, has accordingly changed its recordkeeping
practices.326 The fact that organizations which rely on e-mail have
also begun to regulate its usage and storage demonstrates that e-mail
is indeed used as a regular recordkeeping tool in modem business
practice.
Process, Mgmt. Acct., Feb. 1995, at 40, 41 ("E-mail changed how managers and em-
ployees communicate.").
318. John Teresko & Tn Stevens, Good-By4 Gutenberg?, Indus. Wk., Apr. 3,
1995, at 50.
319. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
320. Linda Himelstein, The Snitch in the System, Bus. Wk., Apr. 17, 1995, at 104,
105.
321. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897,
MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Il1 June 15, 1995) (mem.).
322. Ewell, supra note 36, at 12A.
323. Id.
324. See id.; see also Himelstein, supra note 320, at 105 ("Toyota Motor Sales USA
Inc. hopes to have a new policy concerning its computer information in place by the
end of the year. And Univar Corp. recently underwent an electronic-data audit of
sorts.").
325. See Charles A. Lovell & Roger W. Holmes, The Dangers ofE-Mail: The Need
for Electronic Data Retention Policies, R.I. BJ., Dec. 1995, at 7-8; McNeil & Kort,
supra note 30, at 20-21.
326. See infra notes 335-47 and accompanying text.
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Of course, the fact that e-mail can be used as a recordkeeping de-
vice is not the sole criterion for satisfying FRE 803(6). To focus exclu-
sively on the medium used to create the record while ignoring the
content of the record in the context of the business practice, would
violate the language and purpose of FRE 803(6).
2. The Content of E-mail Often Constitutes a Record of a
Regularly Conducted Business Activity
As noted earlier, courts have applied FRE 803(6) to various types
of interoffice correspondence and memoranda.327 A common concern
in many of these cases is whether the content of the document reflects
a regularly conducted business activity.3' In modern practice, e-mail
often serves as a replacement for paper memoranda.32 9 Although
e-mail is not always used as part of a systematic business activity,330
e-mail is often used to file status reports, to circulate drafts of docu-
ments, and to record a host of other business-related activities; re-
ports, summaries, and client information all get transmitted and stored
on e-mail.331 Even if the e-mail message consists of an opinion, as it
did in Monotype, it may nonetheless qualify as a business record. As
the advisory committee's note states, "[T]he [R]ule specifically in-
cludes ... opinions ... as proper subjects of admissible entries. 3 32
By disallowing an e-mail business report under FRE 803(6), the
Ninth Circuit disregarded the content of the e-mail message and the
business context within which it was created. This approach was in-
consistent with its earlier jurisprudence in Gibbs333 and Catabran.334
The adoption of this approach also leads to the incongruous result of a
business report or memorandum being barred simply because it is
transmitted and stored electronically, when it would otherwise be ad-
missible if recorded on paper.
327. See supra part I.D.
328. Md
329. See Russell Kay, Distributed and Secure, Byte, June 1994, at 165 (noting that
"[e]lectronic document interchange is replacing paper documents," and that "[el-mail
is now being used in place of... memos").
330. See, e.g., Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 91 Civ. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995) (involving dissemination of offensive satire through the cor-
porate e-mail system); Allen v. State, 862 P.2d 487, 491 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (in-
volving e-mail used to discuss marital problems with secretary), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1657 (1994).
331. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
332. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
333. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text. As discussed in Gibbs, the
Ninth Circuit admitted an interoffice memo based on foundation testimony that this
type of memo was often circulated in the course of the business' operations.
334. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. In Catabran, the Ninth Circuit
stressed that the medium of the record was immaterial if the content otherwise satis-
fied the requirements of FRE 803(6).
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3. Changes in Federal Recordkeeping Practices Provide Further
Support for Treating E-mail As a Business Record
Recently, the National Archives Records Administration
("NARA") released new guidelines for the archiving and preparation
of federal e-mail messages. 335 The changes were enacted in response
to a D.C. Circuit opinion which held that substantive federal e-mail
messages constitute records under the Federal Records Act
("FRA").336  In the opinion, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the
wealth of substantive information accumulated by the Reagan Admin-
istration in the form of e-mail.337
The opinion highlighted a reality of modem federal recordkeep-
ing-that "nearly all [fQederal agencies now use e-mail to transact
Government business. 338 In a recent survey conducted by the
NARA, a majority of federal agencies stated that they were using
their e-mail systems to create federal records.339 As a result, the agen-
cies adopted policies to ensure the proper maintenance of federal
e-mail records.340 Additionally, the NARA plans to amend its Man-
aging Electronic Records handbook341 to include further guidance on
the identification and recordkeeping requirements for federal e-mail
records.342
The guidelines require the retention of e-mail "used to transact
[federal] agency business, 3  and will only allow deletion after de-
partmental review.3" While these guidelines are only binding on the
public sector,1 5 "it is likely that such pronouncements will be used as
335. National Archives and Records Administration, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,634 (1995) (to
be published at 36 C.F.R. § 1234).
336. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
337. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1283 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1993). As the court noted:
IT]he substantive importance of these documents is demonstrated by the fre-
quency with which they have been used in recent years. They were used by
the Tower Commission, congressional investigators and the Independent
Counsel looking into the Iran-Contra affair;, by the Department of Justice in
connection with its prosecution of Manuel Noriega; and by the NSC's legal
advisor in relation to the confirmation of Robert Gates as Director of the
CIA.
Id.
338. National Archives and Records Administration, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,634 (1995).
339. Id. at 44,636.
340. Id. at 44,641 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R1 § 1234.24(b)(1)(i)-(vi)).
341. The Managing Electronic Records handbook is a supplement to the NARA's
guidelines, and is designed to provide further information to federal agencies on how
to comport with the FRA. See National Archives and Records Administration, 55
Fed. Reg. 19,216 (1990).
342. 60 Fed. Reg. at 44,635.
343. Id.
344. IL
345. See id. at 44,634 (noting that federal government agencies "will be affected
more immediately by the rule").
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guides by courts and other regulatory bodies when resolving legal is-
sues, such as those regarding ... evidentiary issues." '346
The Armstrong decision and the NARA's subsequent changes may
have an unintended, direct impact on the admissibility of e-mail
records in federal courts. Similar to the business records exception of
FRE 803(6), FRE 803(8) provides a hearsay exception for public
records. By classifying e-mail as a federal record under the FRA, and
by regulating its use as such, the NARA has opened the door to
e-mail's admissibility under FRE 803(8).347 Although the require-
ments of FRE 803(6) and FRE 803(8) are somewhat different, 34 s ad-
mitting e-mail as a record if made by the federal government, but
excluding the same record if made by private businesses, leads to an
incongruous result. Consistency demands that courts admit public and
private business records even-handedly if both are equally
trustworthy.
4. Admitting E-Mail Under FRE 803(6) is Consistent With the
Policies Behind the Business Records Exception
Admitting e-mail as a business record accords with the policies of
necessity and trustworthiness upon which the business records excep-
tion is founded. Moreover, admitting this evidence is consistent with
many courts' approach of liberally construing FRE 803(6) to admit
probative evidence that is otherwise proven reliable.
As discussed in part II.B above, business records are admitted
under policies of necessity and trustworthiness. 19 As with other busi-
ness records, getting to the true source of the information contained in
an e-mail record would likely require testimony of multiple parties,
each of whom may offer only a small piece of the puzzle. Admitting
e-mail under FRE 803(6) avoids the tedium of calling multiple wit-
nesses to ascertain the matters asserted within the business record.
The larger concern with e-mail records appears to be trustworthi-
ness. Courts are willing to admit business records because organiza-
tions rely on their contents for important decisions and because they
are kept in a systematic fashion.350 The requirements of FRE 803(6)
aim to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of a record before it
346. Raysman & Brown, supra note 39, at 7.
347. In fact, § 1234.24 of the C.F.R. states that "Electronic records may be admitted
in evidence to [f]ederal courts for use in court proceedings [under] Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(8)." 36 C.F.R. § 1234.24 (1995). With the changes to the NARA's stan-
dards to include e-mail as an electronic record, this section was redesigned as
§ 1234.26, but was otherwise left intact. See National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,634, 44,641 (1995).
348. For a detailed comparison of FRE 803(6) and FRE 803(8), see Brown v. ASD
Computing Ctr., 519 F. Supp. 1096, 1103 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
349. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
350. See supra part ll.B.
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is admissible.35 1 As discussed above, business and federal organiza-
tions are relying on e-mail in much the same way they have relied on
paper documents in the past. Additionally, policies regarding reten-
tion and deletion are becoming more commonplace; many of these
organizations are taking steps to insure that their e-mail documents
are properly maintained by requiring that messages be printed and
electronically archived.3s
E-mail may also offer additional indicia of trustworthiness that
other computer-based documents might not. E-mail messages are
usually accompanied by transmittal information which contains the
names of the sender and receiver, as well as the time and date the
record was created.3 5 3 The time and date information provides a valu-
able tool for judges in determining whether the record was made in a
timely fashion, as required by FRE 803(6). The name of the sender
helps establish that the record was made by someone "with knowl-
edge," a further requirement of FRE 803(6). Such a feature also
makes the recordmaker accountable for the information contained
within the record, which in turn assures e-mail's trustworthiness.3a
E-mail's unique features also serve to avoid the problems of mis-
perception that cause hearsay documents to be disfavored. 55 With
e-mail, the substance of the record, as well as its transmittal informa-
tion, is electronically memorialized. While these factors alone may
not be dispositive in establishing e-mail as a record under FRE 803(6),
they may serve as added assurances of the document's accuracy.
Further, many courts have taken a less formalistic approach to the
business records exception. As the Second Circuit recently stated:
"Rule 803(6) 'favor[s] the admission of evidence rather than its exclu-
sion if it has any probative value at all.' 3.56 FRE 803(6) does require
a record to carry a "sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be consid-
ered reliable."357 Still, courts have been criticized, even reversed, for
imposing requirements of careful checking, habits of precision, and
regularity in maintaining business records as a precursor for admissi-
bility under FRE 803(6).358 Such requirements impose too severe a
351. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
354. Market pressure on job performance has been cited as one of the factors sup-
porting a business record's trustworthiness. See supra note 172 and accompanying
text.
355. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
356. Phoenix Assocs. III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing In re Ollag
Constr. Equip. Corp., 665 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1981)). The court's reasoning appears
to be derived from the view that the FREs themselves favor the admission of proba-
tive evidence. See Young v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R, 618 F.2d 332,337 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Carranco, 551 F.2d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 1977).
357. Phoenix, 60 F3d at 101 (citation omitted).
358. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 723 F.2d 238, 288-89 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574, (1986).
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burden on parties seeking to establish the regularity of a practice.5 9
As the Third Circuit noted, "Even the pre-rules caselaw does not uni-
formly support so stringent a standard. ' 3 °
Moreover, the advisory committee itself has espoused a policy of
admissibility over exclusion when dealing with novel recordkeeping
dilemmas. As the advisory committee noted, "The formulation of an
approach which would give appropriate weight to all possible factors
in every situation is an obvious impossibility. Hence [FRE 803(6)]
assumes admissibility in the first instance but with ample provision for
escape if sufficient negative factors are present. 361
C. Admission of E-mail Under FRE 803(6) as a Record
of Communication
Thus far, this Note has argued that e-mail created in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity should be admitted under FRE
803(6). While the business records exception may admit a variety of
corporate e-mail messages, FRE 803(6) cannot apply to the content of
all corporate e-mail. The content of personal messages, even if sent
through a corporate e-mail system, will almost certainly be excluded,
as they are under the NARA Guidelines.362 Courts will have a diffi-
cult time accepting the argument that e-mail messages like those in
Strauss and Allen were part of regular business activity.363 Addition-
ally, FRE 803(6) would probably not apply to the content of personal
e-mail sent through commercial on-line services or the Internet364 un-
less the proponent of such evidence could prove that the e-mail was
being transmitted as part of a regularly conducted business activity.
359. See Zenith, 723 F.2d at 288-89.
360. Id. at 289. In what may be the most liberal approach to the regularity require-
ment, one treatise has argued that even if the record was not routinely made, it may
still be admissible. See 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evi-
dence § 803(6)[03], at 803-205 (1995). Weinstein and Berger note:
Since Congress did not intend to make the business record exception more
restrictive than it had previously been, Rule 803(6) has been correctly inter-
preted so that the absence of "routineness" without more is not sufficiently
significant to require exclusion of the record. Nonroutine records made in
the course of a regularly conducted "business" are generally admissible if
they meet the other requirements of Rule 803(6), unless "the sources of in-
formation or other circumstances indicate [a] lack of trustworthiness."
IL This approach was adopted in United States v. Freidin, No. 86 CR. 788 (JFK),
1987 WL 9442, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1987), but was later criticized by the Second
Circuit upon review. See United States v. Freidin, 849 F.2d 716, 721-23 (2d Cir. 1988).
361. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
362. See National Archives and Records Administration, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,634,
44,643 (1995)
363. In Strauss, the e-mail messages at issue involved offensive jokes and remarks.
See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. In Allen, the messages were personal
disclosures of marital difficulties. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. The
employees in question were probably not under a business duty to send those
messages.
364. See supra notes 21-22.
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Another situation exists, however, in which FRE 803(6) could apply
to these types of e-mail messages. A proponent of personal e-mail
may seek to establish the time, date, and parties involved in the trans-
mittal. For example, in Strauss, the plaintiff might seek to use the
e-mail transmittal evidence to show that the messages were sent from
a manager to his employee. In this context, the e-mail would be of-
fered for the truth of what it asserts, and would thus likely face a hear-
say challenge. Nonetheless, the e-mail might be admitted as a
business record.
As a number of other courts have held, records of a communication,
if kept in the regular course of a business activity, can be admitted as
proof of the underlying conversation.2 United States v. Vela, 36 a
Fifth Circuit case, illustrates this point. In Vela, the defendant was
charged with conspiracy to commit a drug-related offense.- 7 Part of
the prosecutor's proof included testimony from the defendant's drug
buyers.3 1 To support the link between the defendant and the two
buyers, the prosecutor introduced copies of phone bills which indi-
cated calls were made between the men.369 Despite the defendant's
hearsay objections to the phone records, the court admitted the evi-
dence under FRE 803(6) as a regularly kept record of the phone
company.370
Accordingly, if a proponent of this type of e-mail evidence could
establish that commercial on-line providers such as America Online or
Prodigy kept such information in the regular course of business,371 lit-
tle difference would exist between e-mail records and phone company
records; the e-mail transmittal information should be equally admissi-
ble. Personal e-mail sent through a corporate e-mail system may also
fall under this rubric. With companies such as CIBA-Geigy and In-
tuit, Inc. archiving records of employee e-mail transmissions,372 a pro-
ponent of transmittal evidence might successfully establish that these
were records kept in the regular course of business, and are thus ad-
missible under FRE 803(6). 33
365. See United States v. Chatman, 994 F.2d 1510, 1516 (10th Cir.) (allowing admis-
sion of cellular phone records), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 230 (1993); United States v.
Mfiller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing admission of phone records in
price fixing case).
366. 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982).
367. Id. at 87.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 89.
370. Id. at 89-90. The court did require an employee of Southwestern Bell to tes-
tify as to how the records were created. Id&
371. America Online presently maintains a complete record of every e-mail
message sent through its system for a period of five days after the message is read by
its recipient; a record of unread e-mail is stored for a full 25 days. See Heyboer, supra
note 22, at 9.
372. See supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
373. Unfortunately, the proponent of the evidence may still likely be unable to use
FRE 803(6) to admit the content of the e-mail message.
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D. Toward a Uniform Approach in Evaluating E-mail Evidence
Under FRE 803(6)
While FRE 803(6) may be useful in admitting e-mail transmittal in-
formation, the exception has a far greater value if it can be used to
admit the content of e-mail messages. Both the language of FRE
803(6), and the relevant case law contain room for the admissibility of
the content of e-mail as a business record. This Note urges that
e-mail, as a recordkeeping system, is a "data compilation" no different
from other forms of computer storage which have been accepted
under FRE 803(6). Additionally, the content of most e-mail messages
is often merely an electronic form of handwritten correspondence or
memoranda, both of which can and have qualified under FRE 803(6).
Congress, however, has issued no clear mandate as to how e-mail evi-
dence should be treated. An amendment expressly including elec-
tronic communications in the language of FRE 803(6) would serve to
clarify the issue.
By acknowledging that an e-mail system, as an electronic storage
medium, is capable of systematic recordkeeping, Congress would en-
able courts to focus on the more crucial elements of FRE 803(6)-the
content of the message and the business context within which it was
made. By enacting changes to FRE 803(6), Congress would also avoid
the incongruous result of having an otherwise admissible record ruled
inadmissible simply because it was made and stored in an e-mail sys-
tem. An amendment would further ensure that traditionally reliable
evidence could be considered by the trier of fact in civil or criminal
cases.
Until such a change takes place, courts faced with the issue of
e-mail's admissibility under FRE 803(6) need a framework within
which to evaluate e-mail evidence. Judges asked to apply FRE 803(6)
to e-mail should adopt a less formalistic approach to e-mail evidence.
Courts dealing with new recordkeeping methods and technologies
such as computer-based records or telex messages have repeatedly
stressed that to evaluate a business record properly, the content and
preparation of the record should be the integral focus of the in-
quiry.3 74 As the D.C. Circuit stated: "The critical factor in determin-
ing whether [a] document satisfie[s] the 'business purpose'
requirement lies in the reason that the message was prepared and
sent, not the means by which it was transmitted. '375 Such an approach
is consistent with the advisory committee's position on evaluating evi-
dence under the Rule.376 Otherwise, the result will be "a tendency
unduly to emphasize a requirement of routineness and repetitiveness
374. See supra notes 217-21, 279-87 and accompanying text.
375. United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
376. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
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and an insistence that other types of records be squeezed into the fact
patterns which give rise to traditional business records. ' 37 7
This is perhaps best illustrated in the context of the opening hypo-
thetical. In evaluating the admissibility of the software company's
e-mail message, the court should first look to see if the manager acted
under a business duty in preparing the underlying report. Since his
job was to evaluate outside purchases, this requirement of FRE 803(6)
would likely be met. The e-mail proponent would then need to show
that these evaluations were regularly kept by the software company.
This too could easily be done by showing that the manager routinely
made a record of such findings. If the court is hesitant about the re-
cordkeeping nature of the e-mail system, the e-mail proponent should
seek to establish that the e-mail system has storage and retrieval capa-
bilities-as most e-mail systems do.378 That no paper copy of the rec-
ord exists would help demonstrate that the e-mail system is being used
for recordkeeping purposes. As this analysis suggests, courts evaluat-
ing e-mail evidence must take an approach no different than their
evaluation of traditional correspondence.3 79
Finally, the proponent of the e-mail evidence may face foundational
issues similar to those arising in the case of other computer-based
records.38 1 The custodial witness may also be asked to demonstrate
the security measures used on the e-mail system.38 ' Courts should not
require, however, that elaborate security measures be in place as a
prerequisite to admitting the e-mail evidence.382
CONCLUSION
E-mail has become a permanent fixture in modem business activity
and recordkeeping. As a result, litigators have begun to utilize e-mail
evidence at trial. If used to prove the truth of what it asserts, how-
ever, e-mail evidence must overcome a hearsay challenge. Where the
e-mail evidence was made or kept by a business, proponents of the
evidence may seek to admit the evidence under FRE 803(6), the busi-
ness records hearsay exception, or under similar state rules of evi-
dence. While both the NARA and the D.C. Circuit appear to have
recognized e-mail as a recordkeeping medium, at least one circuit has
377. United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1537-38 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed.
R. Evid. 803(6) advisory committee's note).
378. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
379. This approach would mirror that taken by the court in Rick v. Toyota Indus.
Equip. Co., No. 93 C 1331, 1994 WL 484633 (N.D. Ml1. Sept. 2, 1994). See supra notes
289-91 and accompanying text.
380. See Stanley A. Kurzban, Authentication of Computer-Generated Evidence in
the United States Federal Courts, 35 IDEA-J.L & Tech. 437 (1995); Traynor, supra
note 76, at B9-10 (discussing how the foundation and authentication of e-mail differs
from computer and handwritten evidence).
381. See Traynor, supra note 76, at BO.
382. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
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taken a different view. Thus, a strong possibility remains that an
otherwise admissible business report or memorandum may be ex-
cluded from evidence simply because it was transmitted and stored
electronically.
This Note demonstrates that e-mail is capable of satisfying the re-
quirements of FRE 803(6). While the admissibility of evidence is a
fact-sensitive issue, this Note argues that the language of FRE 803(6)
is broad enough to include e-mail. Accordingly, courts evaluating
e-mail evidence under FRE 803(6) should focus not on the medium
used to make the record, but on the content of the message and the
business context within which the record was made. Failure to do so
may result in inconsistent treatment of e-mail evidence, and a deroga-
tion of the policies behind the business records exception, which fa-
vors the admissibility of trustworthy, probative evidence.
